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Introduction 
We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new 
global questions of justice, equity, and human rights. It is a new world, but 
America should not fear it. It is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is 
a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy--a policy based on 
constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.  
– Jimmy Carter, Commencement Address at Notre Dame, 1977. 
 
 In the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, when public trust in 
American policy was falling, Jimmy Carter promised a new foreign policy not based on fear and 
containment of communism, but on promoting human rights and fundamental American values 
across the globe. While Carter’s foreign policy had a demonstrably positive impact on some 
American allies, Taiwan is an example of where the results of his policies are less clear. Taiwan 
started to make important developments concerning human rights during this time, but the Carter 
administration’s influence on the process of democratization is difficult to determine.  
 Taiwan provides an interesting case study to see the effects and limits of Carter’s human 
rights policy. Like many other US backed authoritarian countries, Taiwan technically had an 
American inspired democratic constitution. Like these other regimes, Taiwan also justified its 
lack of civil liberties due to a perceived imminent threat from communism. Based on these 
characteristics, it would seem that this is exactly the type of country where Carter’s human rights 
objectives would apply. Taiwan is unique in that it was a major issue in the process of 
normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China, which made Taiwan a more central 
figure in foreign policy despite its small size. Taiwan is also one of the great democratic success 
stories of Asia. The country rapidly developed its economy despite surrounding military threats, 
and gradually introduced democratic reforms. The march towards democratization started in the 
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mid-1970s, after Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded his father, and martial law was eventually lifted in 
1987.  
 Some scholars have mentioned that American influence was an important factor in the 
development of democracy in Taiwan. For instance, John F. Copper writes that “political change 
was fostered by U.S. pressure,” 1 and that “when the U.S. and the world community pressured 
Taiwan to democratize, it followed that advice too.”2 However, what form did that pressure take? 
So far scholars seem to be more focused on the impact of American Congressional influence and 
American based human rights groups than the executive branch’s foreign policy. When Bruce 
Jacobs cites American pressure in Taiwan, he seemed more focused on the Congressional aspect 
of that pressure.3 Richard C. Bush also argues that the pressure from the United States was 
congressional in nature, and argues that this was due to overseas Taiwanese lobbying in 
Congress.4 Andrew Nathan and Helena Ho also take a similar approach, citing the influence of 
the Formosan Association for Public Affairs over key members of Congress, such as Edward 
Kennedy and Stephen Solarz, as being a key factor in pressuring the Taiwanese government to 
lift martial law.5 
 This paper studies the influence of Carter’s human rights policy on the democratization in 
Taiwan, and the limits of that influence. For the first time, many of the government documents 
from the State Department under the Carter administration have been declassified, and these 
                                                          
1 John F. Copper. A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China. (Washington: Ethics and Public 
Policy Center, 1988). xiv 
2 ibid 22 
3 Bruce Jacobs. Democratizing Taiwan. (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 16 
4 Richard C. Bush. At Cross Purpose: US-Taiwan Relations Since 1942. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 209 
5 Andrew J. Nathan and Helena V. S. Ho, “Chiang Ching-kuo’s Decision for Political Reform.” In Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Eds Shao-chuan Leng. (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1993). 
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documents can help provide a better understanding of the impact of the Carter Administration’s 
human rights policy, as well as its faults. This paper will argue that despite the Carter 
administration’s claim that it was implementing a human rights focused foreign policy, the 
administration primarily engaged in traditional Cold War politics in East Asia that were often 
detrimental to promoting human rights in Taiwan. The Carter administration’s leverage over 
Taiwan was also limited due to the negotiations on normalization with the People’s Republic of 
China and the difficulty of maintaining support in Congress for the administration’s agenda on 
normalization. Due to these limitations, American pressure generally came from the American 
embassy’s own initiatives rather than from State Department policy. 
Taiwanese History and Kuomintang Human Rights Abuses 
 The Republic of China, better known now as Taiwan, is a country with a deep identity 
crisis and major security issues. The island’s modern history can be dated back to the mid-17th 
century, when the Ming dynasty collapsed and was replaced by the Manchu Qing dynasty. The 
Ming loyalists, along with thousands of Chinese civilians, moved to Taiwan under the leadership 
of Zheng Chenggong, also known as Koxinga. Zheng defeated the European colonial 
governments, subjugated the aborigines, and established an independent Chinese kingdom on the 
island.6 The Qing eventually invaded Taiwan, defeating the fledgling kingdom, and integrated 
Taiwan as a frontier territory, which it held for centuries. Initially the Qing court was dismissive 
towards the island’s usefulness. Chinese officials considered it to be wild and unruly, and that 
controlling the island would be more difficult than it was worth. Some officials supported 
leaving the island to the aborigines.7  Eventually Shi Lang, the Qing official who defeated the 
                                                          
6 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 17 
7 Gary Marvin Davison. A Short History of Taiwan: The Case of Independence. (Westport: Praeger, 2003). 23 
Grogan 5 
 
Zheng family, convinced the Emperor that it would be a useful base to defend the coastal 
provinces against pirates.8 For the next few centuries, Taiwan was placed under the jurisdiction 
of Fujian province, but Fujian’s governor generally neglected the island.9 The island’s ownership 
changed again in 1895, when the Japanese conquered the island in the Sino-Japanese war. After 
Japan seized Taiwan, the Japanese subjected Taiwan’s population to assimilation policies that 
attempted to root out Chinese influences on the island.  
 Taiwan flourished during its time as a Japanese colony. The Japanese established public 
education systems, modernized healthcare, industrialized the economy, and built railroads 
throughout the island.10 They engaged in programs to educate the populace in Japanese, 
promoted local cultural works to be written in Japanese, and attempted to suppress Chinese 
culture.11 Taiwan became Japan’s model colony, and was a proving ground for total integration 
of colonial territories into Japan.  
 Due to the Japanese occupation, Taiwan was also absent from some of the defining social 
movements and social changes that rocked mainland China. Taiwan never experienced the Han 
nationalism and anti-Manchu sentiment of the 1911 Xinhai revolution. The anti-foreign and 
nationalist May 4th Movement that defined Chinese intellectualism under the Republic of China 
had relatively little effect on the intellectuals of Taiwan. The impact of World War II on the 
mainland was horrific, while there was a significantly smaller impact on Taiwan. Taiwan fared 
better than the rest of East Asia in the War, as it was the best treated colony of Japan. Many 
Taiwanese benefited from Japan’s colonial empire.  Some Taiwanese even served in the 
                                                          
8 Ibid 24 
9 Ibid 24 
10 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, 39 
11 Gary Marvin Davison. A Short History of Taiwan: The Case of Independence, 65 
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Japanese army in the war, and many of those who supported Japan were forced escape the island 
after the war’s end. Due to the Japanese occupation, the Communist Party of China also held 
little influence over the island. 
 When Taiwan was returned to China in 1945, Taiwan was a significantly different society 
than it had been in 1895. Not only was Taiwan merely a minor frontier territory before it was 
conquered, it had missed the collapse of the Qing dynasty and other momentous events that came 
to define the Chinese identity. Lai, Myers, and Wei argue that the Taiwanese adopted a 
“worldview that coincided with prevalent Japanese thinking and clashed with the view of 
Mainlanders.”12 Not only had Taiwanese and mainland culture developed in different directions, 
but Taiwan’s relative wealth compared to the mainland Chinese provinces set it at odds with the 
new mainland Chinese-led government. 
 After 1945 mainland Chinese became the new administrators of Taiwan, rather than the 
local Taiwanese elite who held significant power under the Japanese colonial regime. Due to the 
incompetence of the mainland politicians, and despite Taiwan’s relative economic prosperity 
under Japan, the province began to suffer within a few years of rule by the Republic of China. 
Tensions quickly began to grow as Taiwan chaffed under the corrupt and incompetent rule of the 
Kuomintang. These tensions erupted in 1947 during the horrific 2-28 Incident. 
 On February 28th, 1947, an anti-government protest evolved into a riot. On March 8th, 
mainland Chinese troops arrived to quash the rebellion, and “eyewitnesses reported that as soon 
as they landed, the soldiers opened fire at everyone in sight. Bayoneting, rapes, and robberies 
                                                          
12 Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou. A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 168. 
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were followed by the looting of homes and buildings.”13 An estimated 20,000 Taiwanese were 
killed by Republican soldiers during the incident.14 From the very beginning of mainland 
Chinese rule on the island, the local population was distrusted, discriminated against, and 
oppressed. The 2-28 incident marked the beginning of the decades long White Terror.  
 The situation became more complicated in 1949 after the Communist Party defeated the 
Kuomintang, forcing them into exile. The Kuomintang fled to Taiwan and established their new 
capital in Taipei. They brought with them most of the Chinese elite and over two million 
refugees from Mainland China.15 It would not take long for these refugees, called waishengren, 
to start treating the native born Taiwanese, benshengren, as second class citizens. The 
Kuomintang, refusing to recognize that the war was lost, maintained martial law and suspended 
all new elections of the legislature, the Legislative Yuan. Politicians elected in mainland China in 
1948 would maintain their seats until their deaths, as the “war” would never end. Even when 
Carter was President of the United States, the vast majority of the legislature was still made up of 
mainland Chinese politicians who had never faced an election in Taiwan. Some scholars, such as 
Bruce Jacobs, describe the Kuomintang’s government as being essentially a colonial 
government.16 
The Kuomintang consistently cracked down on dissent in the media as well. Outlets that 
supported Taiwanese independence were promptly banned. Other journals that offered more mild 
critiques of government policy were tolerated until they criticized something vital to Kuomintang 
policy, after which they were shut down as well. Huang Ching-lung describes the media industry 
                                                          
13 Sylvia Li-Chun Yin. Representing Atrocity in Taiwan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 4. 
14 Ibid 4 
15 Lai Tse-han, Myers, and Wei. A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947,  1. 
16 Bruce Jacobs. Democratizing Taiwan, 23. 
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in Taiwan as a “patron-client relationship” between the government and the newspaper 
companies.17 After the declaration of martial law it was forbidden to start a newspaper, creating a 
system where the government could directly influence the news media by threatening to revoke 
their legal status. Small and illegal newspapers were common in Taiwan, but when they became 
large enough to be noticed they were swiftly shut down. Among these newspapers were Free 
China and, most famously, Formosa Magazine, which was at the center of the Kaohsiung 
Incident in 1979.  
 Taiwan’s human rights abuses took the form of consistent arrests, executions, and 
murders of dissidents. During Taiwan’s “White Terror,” thousands of suspected communists and 
other dissidents were arrested, many of whom were detained on faulty evidence or for other 
political reasons, and sometimes dissidents were executed. One estimate from Taiwanese 
politician Hsieh Tsung-min, himself a political prisoner during the White Terror, was that 
140,000 people were persecuted, of whom 3,000 to 4,000 were executed.18 Both waishengren 
and benshengren were persecuted in the White Terror, but some activists felt that the White 
Terror was used as an excuse to the persecute independence activists. As independence activists 
were so heavily persecuted on Taiwan itself, the main independence organizations at this time 
were formed abroad.19 Examples of these groups were Taiwan Independence Movement, based 
                                                          
17 Huang Ching-lung. “The Changing Roles of the Media in Taiwan’s Democratization Process.” The Brooking 
Institution for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, July, 2009. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/07_taiwan_huang.pdf  4 
18 Huang Tai-lin. “White Terror exhibit unveils part of the truth.” Taipei Times. May 20, 2005. 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/05/20/2003255840/2 
19 Shelley Rigger. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. (London: Routledge, 1999), 108. 
Grogan 9 
 
out of Japan, and World United Formosans for Independence, who were based out of the United 
States.20 
In 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo became premier and started to appoint more native 
Taiwanese. One of these appointees was Lee Tenghui, the moderate Kuomintang politican who 
would finish transforming Taiwan into a democracy after becoming President in 1988. While 
local grassroots elections had been held consistently by the Kuomintang after taking control of 
Taiwan, these elections started to become heavily contested under Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
premiership. However, the opposition would often claim that fraud was rampant in these 
elections. Accusations of fraud in a 1978 local election in Chungli even caused a riot.21 Since 
political parties were still illegal at this time, opposition figures began to organize the dangwai 
movement, or the non-party movement. There was still a number of egregious abuses of human 
rights during this era. There were hundreds of political prisoners, some of whom alleged they 
were tortured while held by the police and forced to sign confessions. The Kaohsiung Incident in 
1979 would be a critical moment in the history of Taiwanese democratization. In that incident, a 
protest devolved into a riot, which caused the police to arrest the majority of the major 
opposition figures over the proceeding days.  
Taiwan was a typical authoritarian state, which used a veneer of democracy to cover its 
abusive practices. Like many other American backed authoritarian states, it justified its human 
rights issues by claiming they were necessary due to communist threats. However, after rapid 
political change in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it has become a fully-fledged democratic 
                                                          
20 Harvey Feldman, Interviewed by Edward Dillery, March 11, 1999. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, 
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, VA, www.adst.org. 26 
21 From American Embassy Taipei to Secretary of State. Telegram 07217. “The Chungli Election Riot.” December 3, 
1978. Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59: General Records of the Department of 
State, National Archives. https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=281872&dt=2532&dl=1629 
Grogan 10 
 
society. Today Taiwan has a high tech economy, high standards of living and education, as well 
as a thriving and competitive political environment.  
Defining Human Rights 
 During the 20th century, human rights became increasingly important in American 
foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson’s view on self-determination and universalist democratic 
values laid the groundwork for American ideals on human rights and served as a blueprint for 
future developments of human rights theory, but it was due to World War II and the creation of 
the United Nations that the meaning of human rights was defined. Despite America’s leading 
role in developing modern human rights theory, the United States would often be at odds with its 
moral values when conducting diplomacy throughout the 20th century, especially in the context 
of East Asia during the Cold War. 
 After the signing of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 the 
definition of human rights was well established. Among the many rights included in the 
declaration were freedom of expression, the right to participate democratically in government, 
and the right to due process.22 Forty-four countries voted in favor of the declaration while none 
against it, although the communist states abstained. Among those that voted for the declaration 
were the United States and the Republic of China. Many of the countries that voted for the 
declaration were already violating these rights. 
 While the United States had a clear definition of human rights and had a history of 
supporting national self-determination and promoting America’s democratic values, the issues 
                                                          
22 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations, December 10th 1948. http://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/ 
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stemming from the Soviet Union’s aggressive expansion immediately drew dramatic responses 
from the United States. 
 Gaddis Smith’s Morality, Reason and Power, written a few years after the end of Carter’s 
presidency, provides a good framework to analyze the contradictory goals of American foreign 
policy in the 20th century in. Smith describes the history of US foreign policy as a struggle 
between internalist and externalist factions. Smith sees America in the early Cold War as 
dominated by externalists, whose primary motivation is reacting to external threats rather than 
deriving foreign policy from the nation’s internal values and goals. Smith asks if the United 
States should be “concerned primarily with prevailing over particular hostile nations, specifically 
the Soviet Union,” or whether “an enlightened foreign policy be focused on the universal 
problems of the human condition?”23  
He traces the origins of America’s diplomatic conundrum back to Woodrow Wilson, who 
believed confidently in the right to national self-determination while also arguing that the 
Americans were the “champions of the rights of mankind” and vehemently opposed dealing with 
autocratic governments. 24 Due to the crises of the Cold War and the threat created by the Soviet 
Union, the United States was forced to use an externalist foreign policy that was primarily 
concerned with containment of communism rather than moralist objection to all authoritarian or 
otherwise immoral regimes. Smith uses the Vietnam War as an example, where the American 
government was forced to choose between a colonial regime, and a communist victory. While 
                                                          
23 Gaddis Smith, Morality Reason and Power. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986). 15 
24 ibid 16 
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the United States had been opposed to colonialism, the Americans decided to back the French 
military’s intervention in Vietnam.25  
In the case of Taiwan, Carter was forced to make choices that would prioritize the 
security of the United States while also having negative repercussions on the democratization 
movement in Taiwan. Despite his vocal support for idealism, the reality was that his policies 
were firmly within the externalist school of thought. The issue of human rights in Taiwan was 
often ignored for the sake of pursuing normalization with China, ensuring congressional support 
for the normalization process, and preventing Taiwan from acquiring nuclear weapons. The 
Carter administration’s attempts to deal with these issues left them with little leverage to promote 
human rights. 
Chapter 1: American Diplomacy in the Republic of China 
 Throughout the early 20th century, the relationship between the Kuomintang and the 
United States can be seen as that of reluctant allies. Despite major ideological differences that 
stretch back to the end of the First World War, the United States and the Kuomintang were 
forced into cooperation by dire circumstances. The United States was, from the beginning, 
distrustful of Chiang Kai-shek and his government. After Chiang’s defeat on the mainland, 
although the activities of the Kuomintang went against the values that the United States was 
trying to promote to the world, the United States reluctantly remained a steadfast ally due to the 
circumstances of the broader Cold War.  
 From its inception, the Kuomintang’s Republic of China was never democratic. Few 
political parties were allowed to operate, and the system was designed to ensure that the 
                                                          
25 ibid 24 
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Kuomintang would always win elections. The Kuomintang’s claim to legitimacy was hinged 
purely on its nationalism and its ability to bring stability to China. In the 1930s, since the 
Kuomintang was unable to trust the liberal western powers due to a century of humiliation at 
their hands, the Republic of China flirted with the authoritarian regimes of the world. Chiang 
Kai-Shek sent his oldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to study in the Soviet Union, and his second 
son, Chiang Wei-kuo, to Germany, where he even served briefly in the Wehrmacht.26 The 
Kuomintang’s relationship with the Soviet Union made the democratic powers wary of Chiang’s 
regime. China’s relationship with Germany culminated in the arrival of German military advisers 
who would help modernize the Chinese army. German military equipment was imported and 
used by the Chinese military. Even when Chiang was still on the mainland, he studied the 
leading examples of authoritarian governments and modeled his military and party on those 
examples. The influence from these years would still be apparent in the Taiwanese regime after 
their retreat to Taiwan. 
The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 led to Germany ending its relationship with 
China, and the growing power of the Chinese Communist Party made Chiang Kai-shek 
distrustful of the Soviet Union.27 While there had long been resentment towards the western 
powers, the United States and the European powers became a secondary issue after the Japanese 
invasion. The invasion of China in 1937 forever changed the landscape of foreign intervention in 
China, as the overwhelming power of the Japanese reduced any influence that the British and the 
Americans still held in treaty ports. After the Japanese seized the Shanghai International 
Settlement, the foreign powers renounced their claims to the treaty ports in Mainland China. The 
                                                          
26 Jay Taylor. The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), 68. 
27 Ibid 68 
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United States and the British were forced into cooperation with the Kuomintang, and General 
Stillwell was sent to China to help lead the war effort against the Japanese. Stillwell, however, 
looked down on Chiang and was worried about fighting between factions in the Kuomintang.28 
China became reliant on American military and economic aid to survive the war. 
Hostilities between the Kuomintang and the Communists resumed after the Allied victory 
in World War II. The Truman administration was wary about overextending in China. While 
there was substantial US aid at first, General George C. Marshall thought that preventing a 
communist victory would require direct intervention that the United States was not ready to 
support.29 Unable to turn the tide of the war without direct intervention, the United States 
recognized it was impossible for them to change the outcome of the war. The communists were 
victorious and the remnants of the Kuomintang military, as well as millions of civilians, fled to 
the island of Taiwan. 
Shortly after the end of the civil war, on January 5, 1950 President Truman announced 
that the United States would not interfere in the Taiwan Strait Crisis.30 Truman argued that the 
UN resolution of December 8, 1949 recognized that the United States nor any other foreign 
power had the right to seek spheres of influence or obtain special rights and privileges within the 
territory of China. He claimed that Taiwan was included in this statement, and that the United 
States government would adhere to it. No American forces would be sent to Taiwan nor would 
military advice be given to the regime on Taiwan.  
                                                          
28 Ernest R. May. “1947-1948: When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China. The Journal of Military History, Vol 
66, October, 2002. 1001-1010. http://www.marshallfoundation.org/newsroom/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2016/01/May-2002.pdf 1004 
29 Ibid 1008 
30 Harry S. Truman. “Statement on Formosa, January 5, 1950.” USC US-China Institute. http://china.usc.edu/harry-
s-truman-%E2%80%9Cstatement-formosa%E2%80%9D-january-5-1950 
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Truman had many reasons to end support for Chiang’s regime. For one, the United States 
had already expended considerable resources in propping up the regime on the mainland. 
American military personnel even during the war against Japan were critical of Chiang’s 
government. Infighting and corruption was rife throughout the Kuomintang regime. When defeat 
became imminent in the civil war, Chiang turned on many of his generals and crippled his own 
military’s ability to resist the communists. Despite Chiang resigning the presidency in 1948, he 
was constantly fighting with the new Acting President Li Zongren. Although Chiang was no 
longer the President, the Kuomintang was overwhelmingly loyal to Chiang, and he orchestrated 
the retreat to Taiwan. He abandoned Acting President Li and his army in the mainland, where Li 
was still fighting to maintain a foothold. Chiang then had the legislature declare himself 
president, and declared Li to be a traitor. Li Zongren, who was still attempting to use what little 
army he had left to defend Guangdong and Guangxi in Southern China, fled in defeat to the 
United States, where he met with President Truman, and Li denounced Chiang as a usurper with 
no constitutional authority to claim to be president.31 In October of 1949, after Chiang seized 
control of Taiwan, Li Zongren proposed United States could occupy Taiwan, stating that he 
preferred “a joint Sino-American Commission govern Taiwan” and the United States simply 
“could promise [to] cede Taiwan back to China some future time.”32 However, Truman decided 
in the end to ignore Li and the Taiwan issue. 
 The Korean War would force Truman to change his stance on Taiwan. Due to the conflict 
with the Chinese in Korea, Truman could not afford to lose Taiwan as well. He dispatched an 
                                                          
31 Robert E. Bedeski. “Li Tsung-jen and the Third Force.” Asian Survey. Vol. 5, No. 12 (Dec., 1965), pp. 616-628 
32 “The Charge (Strong) to the Secretary of State.” October 23, 1949. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 
The Far East: China, Volume IX, eds E. Ralph Perkins and Frederick Aandahl. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1974). Document 435. 
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American fleet to the Taiwan Strait to defend the island, and the United States began providing 
military and economic support for the regime on Taiwan.33 American troops were stationed on 
Taiwan for the next few decades. 
 The United States should be seen as both fundamental and reluctant in the creation of 
modern Taiwan. There was lingering distrust of the Kuomintang. Chiang’s own claim to being 
the President of the Republic of China was being challenged by exiled President Li Zongren. 
However, the United States was forced to side with Chiang because of the Cold War. The 
Korean War forced the United States to deal with Chiang’s regime in Taiwan despite their 
mistrust in Chiang’s regime.  
The outcome of the Chinese Civil War was controversial in America, especially among 
members of Congress. Eventually, a mythology developed that America “lost” China as an ally, 
and that the outcome of the war was due to a fault in American diplomacy.34 The loss of a 
potential ally in possible future conflicts with the Soviet Union was worrying to American 
politicians. Members of the Republican Party were particularly critical of the Truman 
administration and of Marshall. Senator McCarthy was one of the most notable and critical 
opponents of American foreign policy in Asia in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War.  
While American politicians were upset that China had been lost as a potential ally, there 
was no love for the Kuomintang in particular. It was common view to blame the Kuomintang as 
an incompetent and corrupt political party, and that all of the American aid given to them was 
                                                          
33 Martin L. Lasater. “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan.” In The United States and the Republic of China. Eds Steven W. 
Mosher. 101-127. 103. 
34 Ernest R. May. “1947-1948: When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China. The Journal of Military History, Vol 
66, October, 2002. 1001-1010. http://www.marshallfoundation.org/newsroom/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2016/01/May-2002.pdf 1010 
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functionally wasted.35 However, the reality was that Kuomintang would continue to claim to be a 
government in exile on Taiwan for years to come, and the Taiwan Problem would come to 
dominate America’s relationship with the communist regime on mainland China. American 
foreign policy was critical in the inception of the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan, and it was 
politically impossible to abandon the island even when it became a constant problem in Chinese-
American relations. 
The relationship between the new Republic of China on Taiwan and the United States 
was formalized by the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of 
China, which also bound the two states to promoting democracy. Article three of the treaty states 
that both countries must be committed to strengthening their “free institutions,” as well as to 
increase economic and social development.36 The inclusion of this language is interesting, as it 
suggests that it was in the United States best interest to promote real democratic progress in their 
allied nations, although the United States never used this aspect of the treaty to criticize the 
Taiwanese government. This language would also prove controversial to some human rights 
activists in the coming years, as Taiwan stagnated under martial law for decades, even as the 
threat from the mainland continued to subside.37 To these activists, the language suggested that 
the United States had a duty to use its influence to promote democratic development in the 
Republic of China.  
                                                          
35 Laura Tyson Li. Book Review: 'The Generalissimo' by Jay Taylor. In The Washington Post.  
Sunday, April 26, 2009.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/04/23/AR2009042303315.html 
36 “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, December 2 1954.” 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chin001.asp#art1 
37 Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organization of the Committee on International Relations, 
House of Representatives of the Ninety-Fight Congress, First Session. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, June 14, 1977). 15.  
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In the immediate aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, however, the United States’ 
primary goal was to build strong relationships with non-communist countries in Asia in pursuit 
of containment policy, forcing the United States to ignore the harsh regimes in these allied 
nations. A key moment for US-ROC relations was President Eisenhower’s 1960 visit to Taiwan, 
the first and last presidential visit. It illustrates the early Cold War relationship between the 
United States and the Republic of China; the United States played along with Chiang’s grand 
claims of liberating the mainland while trying to emphasize that the Kuomintang should focus on 
building an economically successful and free society at home. The United States also remained 
silent on the issue of Taiwanese independence. While Eisenhower’s visit to Taiwan was received 
with great fanfare and has remained a point of pride for many Taiwanese today, for the United 
States it was merely a brief stop on the much more important visit to Japan to discuss the 
ratification of the 1960 US-Japanese security treaty. After Eisenhower’s tour of Asia, he issued a 
report citing his tour as a success in the war against international communism. He argued for a 
confrontational attitude towards communism, saying “we cannot win out against the Communist 
purpose to dominate the world by being timid, passive, or apologetic when we are acting in our 
own and the free world’s purpose.”38 The obvious contradictions in his statement were that South 
Korea and Taiwan were certainly not free countries. There had never been a legitimate 
democratic election in Taiwan for the national government, there was no freedom of speech, and 
the country was rife with discrimination. However, the island remained important as a bulwark 
against the threat from the Soviet Union and Communist China. 
Chiang and Eisenhower both gave speeches at the event. Eisenhower was careful to 
always refer to the country as the Republic of China or Free China, and always called its citizens 
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Chinese. He was also careful however to not praise the Republic’s military, nor to make any 
suggestion that the United States or Taiwan could liberate the mainland. Instead, he focused on 
praising the significant economic development on the island. He said that “the search for lasting 
peace comprehends much more than the erection of sure defense. Perhaps nothing offers greater 
hope to a war-weary world than new opportunities for a better life which have been opened…by 
the magnificent achievements of science and technology.”39 He would go on to praise the 
industrialization of Taiwan and the success of land reform on the island. Chiang gave a speech 
afterwards with a remarkably different tone. Chiang first claimed that the Republic of China 
holds all of the same democratic ideals as the United States, before going on to state that the 
situation on the mainland was unacceptable. He said that the “stave of slavery can never be 
permitted to perpetuate itself” and that “we have succeeded in building here on Taiwan a base for 
the liberation of all people on the mainland.”40  
While Chiang stopped short of reiterating his support for military intervention on the 
mainland, he made it clear that the American and Kuomintang vision of the future of Taiwan was 
quite different. Chiang’s primary focus was still on reclaiming the mainland, even though by the 
1960s this was impossible. Eisenhower recognized in his speech however that Taiwan could only 
use their capitalist system to promote their industries to the fullest and raise their standard of 
living as high as possible in order to serve as a role model. He implied that Taiwan would have 
to remain separated from the mainland in the longer term and focus on its domestic issues.  
Congress and lobbying groups in the United States would also have an important role in 
developing foreign policy towards Taiwan. Since the supporters of the Kuomintang and 
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Taiwanese human rights activists were both called “pro-Taiwan,” it makes looking at the 
discourse of American policy towards Taiwan difficult. There were two different pro-Taiwan 
lobbies in America, the pro-Kuomintang lobby and the overseas Taiwanese dissidents. When 
discussing the Pro-Taiwan lobby in congress, this refers to the supporters of the Republic of 
China government. These were generally anti-communist hardliners and were concerned with the 
security of Taiwan in the face of mainland aggression. The overseas Taiwanese community often 
had very different opinions, with many of them opposing the Kuomintang regime, which they 
saw as oppressive and discriminatory. An example of this is the International Committee for the 
Defense of Human Rights in Taiwan, which publishes their own periodical, Taiwan 
Communique, in support for Taiwan’s right to self-determination.41 
Within Congress, the support for Taiwan was generally synonymous for support for the 
Kuomintang. Among the most famous senators who were staunch supporters of the Chiang Kai-
shek regime were Barry Goldwater and Bob Dole.42 These senators were often wary of 
normalizing the relationship with the People’s Republic of China, supported continuing military 
cooperation, and most importantly, wanted to continue arms shipments to Taiwan regardless of 
pressure from Mainland China. 
While Washington was generally wary but supportive of the Kuomintang, the staff at the 
American embassy in Taiwan held a negative view of Chiang and his government. David Brown 
was a junior Foreign Service Officer in Taiwan in the years following Eisenhower’s visit, and he 
described his colleagues’ attitudes towards Chiang as “Disrespectful I would say. He wasn't in 
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senility at this point, but he was in declining health and the whole idea that he was going to lead 
them back to the mainland was obviously a charade.”43 Brown also described the oppressive 
atmosphere of Taiwan in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He remarked that the posters of Chiang 
throughout the island made Taiwan resemble a communist country more than a democratic one, 
and that “there still were pillboxes at main intersections, creating an image that if there was ever 
any unrest; soldiers were going to be ready to gun down the populace.”44 He also said that in this 
time, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son and successor, already had “a very dark 
image.”45 
Harvey Feldman, another Foreign Service officer stationed in Taiwan, stated that “I and 
most of my colleagues in the embassy felt considerable sympathy for the ordinary Taiwanese.” 
He went on to criticize the military system of Taiwan, where the officers were almost entirely 
Mainland Chinese while the draftees were mostly Taiwanese.46 
The State Department’s policy was also contradictory. Mark Pratt, another Foreign 
Service officer in Taiwan, describes how they were expected by the State Department to monitor 
closely the elections, which would draw criticism from the Taiwanese government, and ended 
with State Department ultimately reprimanding the Foreign Service officers for following 
instructions.47 
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The Nixon presidency greatly changed America’s relationship with Taiwan. Nixon’s 
1971 visit to China was devastating for the island. It also set a radical new direction for 
American foreign policy in East Asia. With China potentially becoming America’s most 
important partner in the region, other East Asian nations were afraid they would be sidelined. 
Over the next decade, normalization of American relations with China would dominate 
American foreign policy. 
For the Nixon and Ford administrations, the new relationship with Mainland China 
offered a major turning point in the Cold War. Befriending China was an opportunity to weaken 
the position of the Soviet Union. Due to these security concerns, progressing on the recognition 
of China was a top priority, and the Taiwan issue was merely distracting noise. While the two 
administrations had little interest in human rights in Taiwan, the American staff on the ground in 
Taiwan did work to promote American values. 
In the years immediately before Carter assumed office, the United States was not willing 
to criticize human rights abuses in allied nations at the highest levels. However, American 
personnel in Taiwan were deeply aware of the human rights issues there, and did try to help the 
Taiwanese people in small ways on their own. According to Harvey Feldman, a primary function 
of the US embassy was to monitor the relationship between the Taiwanese and the 
mainlanders.48 The efforts of the staff at the American embassy, USIA, and other organizations 
did play a small but important role in promoting human rights in Taiwan in this time period. 
The State Department was interested in identifying and cultivating the potential new 
leadership around the world in the hopes that the future generation of leadership would be pro-
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American. In 1973, the State Department required all embassies to compile a plan on promoting 
a pro-American youth.49 The American embassy in Taipei mentioned in their report that the 
leadership was exceptionally old, and that a new generation of leadership would soon take shape. 
The report concludes that the United States should focus on targeting the political leadership, 
military leadership, and the bureaucracy, as these were the areas that had the most impact on 
Taiwanese society as a whole. The report also recommended devoting 25% of resources towards 
USIA Cultural and Information programming.50 The USIA program would prove quite 
successful in promoting American values in Taiwan. 
The United States Information Agency, which was also known as United States 
Information Service overseas, was responsible for important cultural programs that were 
influential in spreading American values. Throughout Taiwan, USIA established offices, 
libraries, and art exhibitions to promote cross-cultural understanding, and in effect also gave 
voices to local Taiwanese artists and independence activists, sometimes to the chagrin of the 
Kuomintang. 
For example, exhibits helped promote the work of local Taiwanese artists. Neal 
Donnelly, an American Foreign Service officer worked on the project, recalls the case of an artist 
from Peng Min, an area of Tainan County. Originally a fisherman, the man made some headway 
into the art scene due to good reviews from some Taipei art critics, who with the help of the 
American government set up an exhibit of his work in Taipei. The exhibit was a huge success, 
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showing a new style that focused on local Taiwanese inspired subjects, and often included 
Taiwanese and Japanese symbolism. Some found his work to be unpatriotic towards the 
Republic of China, and the newspapers, which were heavily influenced by the government, 
attacked his character and discredited his work.51 The case does present an interesting example 
however of how US cultural programs could promote Taiwanese dissident culture. 
The libraries established by USIS were also important in providing material to the 
Taiwanese opposition. Donnelly describes how the libraries were like “intellectual magnets,” and 
states that the Taiwanese opposition was blessed by “very intelligent opposition people… not 
wild radicals.” K’ang Ning-hsiang, a famous Taiwanese dissident who would go on to be a 
prominent Democratic Progressive Party politician, regularly used the American library in 
Tainan. The libraries had all of the published American Congressional Records, which were 
useful for opposition activists to see what American politicians were saying about Taiwan, and to 
gauge the level of support they had in the American Congress. 
American cultural centers also drew negative attention from radical Chinese nationalists. 
In one incident, after the Kissinger visit to mainland China, the USIS office and library in Tainan 
was bombed. Local Taiwanese students from a fishing village were seriously injured in the 
attack. One student even lost a leg. Ambassador Walter McConaughy intervened, and raised 
$5000 for the students injured in the bombing, which insured they could go to college. One of 
the students, thanks to the funding from the American government, eventually went on to obtain 
a PhD and stayed in contact with American personnel long after the bombing.52 
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Donnelly’s Taiwanese assistant claimed that the Garrison officers and police officers at 
the scene of the bombing destroyed evidence.53 The police wrongly arrested an innocent 
Taiwanese man, Hsieh Tsung-min. American officials were deeply suspicious of the official 
story, and the convicted man was released only a few years later. Eventually the bombing 
suspect was even able to visit the United States, where he was able to meet with American 
officials. The rumor amongst American staff was that the son of a prominent general carried out 
the bombing because he was angry at the United Nations, which had recently allowed the 
People’s Republic of China to replace Taiwan. Neal Donnelly claimed he was told this story by a 
magistrate, and speculated that it makes sense, because only someone with deep military 
connections could obtain the explosives required for the attack.54 
Donnelly dismissed the notion that a Taiwanese could be behind the attack. He said that 
the Americans were “a beacon for the Taiwanese,” and that “The United States… is a democratic 
society and we were pushing democracy in all sorts of ways. We were sending a lot of students 
from Taiwan, both mainlanders and Taiwanese, to the United States, and they liked what they 
saw. They saw us as a counter balance. If the United States wasn’t there, God knows how 
repressive the regime of Chiang Kai-shek would be.”55 
While the United States was a destination for Taiwanese dissidents in this time period, 
and there was speculation that the Americans were helping them, this was not always the case. 
For instance, when Peng Ming-min fled to the United States in 1970, there was speculation that 
the United States spirited him out of the country. Peng, who advocated for Taiwanese 
independence, was widely respected by human rights activists, and his supporters were pressing 
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for American support while Peng was in jail.56 However, the American government was actually 
not involved in his escape from Taiwan.57 
While the United States was not confrontational about human rights, there was an 
undeniable impact due to programs like USIA. Embassy officials, and staff of other American 
missions, were deeply aware of the ongoing human rights issues and did what they could to help 
alleviate some of these problems. The United States was generally respectful of Taiwanese 
dissidents, and while the Americans did not always actively help them, the Americans were 
usually generous to them in discussions. American personnel in Taiwan also generally held very 
negative views of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. The election of Carter in 1976 however 
would greatly impact America’s relationship with rightwing authoritarian dictatorships, and the 
Carter administration’s new overt approach to human rights around the world would start in a 
new era in American diplomacy.  
Chapter 2: Human Rights, China, and Arms Sales to Taiwan 
 Carter set the scene by appointing Patricia Derian as Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights at the Human Rights Bureau. Derian was a civil rights leader, and not a career 
diplomat. While this offered an opportunity to transform the State Department’s approach to 
human rights, her appointment caused internal conflicts between the East Asia Bureau, led by 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrook, and the Human Rights Bureau. This was 
exacerbated by her bureau’s integration into the decision making process on arms sales, which 
was one of the few ways the bureau had to achieve its objectives. 
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 Derian’s Human Rights Bureau’s “Major Goals and Objectives” identifies three goals for 
the Human Rights Bureau. “(a) promote increased observance of international recognized human 
rights by all countries. (b) Ensure that human rights considerations are an integral part of the 
foreign policy making process. (c) Provide a coordinating focus for departmental and inter-
agency foreign policy implementation of human rights objectives.”58 Using these criteria to 
examine the case of Taiwan, it is clear that the Carter administration failed to fully meet these 
goals in Taiwan. One of the key reasons was that the human rights department lacked the 
leverage to achieve their goals.  
Derian outlined the methods the Human Rights Bureau used to enforce the new human 
rights policy in a speech at the American Association of University Women in Milwaukee in 
1980. She said that the Carter administration was implementing human rights legislation by 
publicly talking about the issue, acting symbolically, strengthening international institutions, 
tying human rights to international aid, restricting sales of police equipment to authoritarian 
regimes, and finally, by tying military aid to human rights.59 
 Arms sales were systematically tied to the Human Rights Bureau under the Carter 
administration. There were monthly meetings on arms sales presided over by Deputy Secretary 
Warren Christopher. Patricia Derian would also attend these meetings, and would often present 
the case against selling arms to various countries. While the Human Rights Bureau was present 
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in these meetings, the ultimate decision came down to Warren Christopher’s judgement on the 
matter.60  
In certain countries, Derian was successful in blocking sales of police and military 
equipment. For instance, the Human Rights Bureau blocked the sale of tear gas to Guatemala.61 
Anthony Lake, the Director of Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, reported to 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that human rights had become the “dominant factor” in arms 
sales to Latin American countries, and this was due to the small likelihood of the Soviet Union 
increasing their influence in the region and the small economic impact of arms sales in the 
region.62 
Derian had more trouble in establishing human rights as an important factor in arms sales 
in East Asia. Robert B. Oakley, who worked in East Asian Affairs, was responsible for arguing 
the case for selling arms to nations in East Asia. He described how the East Asia and Human 
Rights Bureaus would have wildly different interpretations of what it meant to promote human 
rights. In one case in Indonesia, the East Asia Bureau arranged the sales of F-5 fighter jets in 
return for the return for the release of 35,000 ethnic Chinese prisoners who had spent twelve 
years in jail. Derian was furious when she discovered the plan, and asked her name to be 
removed from any documents pertaining to the deal. While she called it a “travesty” Oakley 
referred to it as “one of the administration’s greatest human rights achievements.”63 This raises 
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the question of whether denying arms sales should be used as a punitive measure for human 
rights abuses, or whether arms sales could be essentially used as an incentive to promote human 
rights. In this case in Indonesia, since the United States wanted to increase the security of 
Indonesia, it seems that it was able to achieve both objectives of promoting regional security and 
human rights in one move. For idealists like Derian however, the idea was reprehensible.  
The East Asia Bureau and Human Rights Bureau clashed often. Oakley mentions that 
“human rights groups gave our Bureau the signal honor of determining that we had been the 
Bureau that had more successfully resisted their wishes than any regional bureau in the 
Department.”64 Derian also had a fraught relationship with Holbrooke, largely due to the State 
Department giving precedence to normalization with China over other concerns. One example of 
their competition was over Derian’s planned invitation of the Dalai Lama to the United States. 
Holbrooke and the East Asia bureau fought back, worrying that inviting the Dalai Lama would 
be inconvenient for the budding relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the 
United States.65 The two sides struggled to find common ground on the issue. 
While the Human Rights Bureau and the East Asia Bureau had a number of 
disagreements, when it came to arms sales in Taiwan Derian and the Human Rights Bureau had 
little influence. Although human rights was supposed to be an integral part of the arms sales 
process, and Derian did argue in favor of limiting arms sales on human rights grounds in Taiwan, 
this was impossible in the case of Taiwan. 
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Due to the issues of normalization with China, there was both a ceiling and floor to the 
number and quality of arms sales to Taiwan. The process of normalization required that the 
United States withhold the latest technology from Taiwan out of fear of upsetting the Chinese 
during the delicate negotiations. At the same time, pro-Taiwanese members of Congress would 
require arms sales to continue in a symbolic move to show continuing American support for 
Taiwan. This resulted in the administration needing to find a clever way to deny sales to Taiwan 
in order to appease the Chinese while not drawing backlash in Congress. One tool they used was 
human rights. 
 Harvey Feldman, a Foreign Service officer who worked in Taiwan, described the human 
rights policy as “excuses… for not supplying defensive arms that Taiwan needed… I call it an 
‘excuse’ because the Carter administration was concerned about upsetting the relationship with 
the PRC that Brzezinski had considered so important.”66 This also meant that, due to the sales 
already being denied for the sake of appeasing China, they could not actually use the threat of 
cutting military aid in order to promote human rights. Normalization with China took priority, 
and this limited the leverage the United States had to promote human rights in Taiwan. 
 While the administration pushed forward on normalization, there was a struggle within 
the Department between supporters of arming Taiwan with that latest equipment, and those who 
wanted to reduce sales to a minimum to smooth the relationship with mainland China. This 
largely came in the form of debates over what type of fighters to sell to Taiwan. 
 Harvey Feldman wanted to supply some of the more advanced equipment they had 
available, believing that Taiwan needed a strong air force to maintain dominance over the 
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Taiwan Strait.67 Taiwan was primarily interested in obtaining the new F-16, but Feldman 
realized that it would be impossible to get his superiors to agree to the sale due to the 
normalization with China. So, he tried to get approval to sell the new F-5G, which was an 
upgraded model of a plane that was already available for sale. 
 The process to obtain approval was grueling. Virtually every major figure dealing with 
the People’s Republic of China needed to give approval, from the PRC Country Director, to 
Holbrooke, and then eventually multiple members of the National Security Council, until it 
finally landed on Carter’s desk. Carter rejected the deal in the end.68   
Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, understood that arms sales 
were of paramount importance to the Taiwanese. The Taiwanese air force in particular was aging 
and reaching obsolescence, while the Chinese were slowly improving their military capabilities. 
During discussions in the White House on what equipment should be sold to Taiwan, State and 
Defense were divided on what types of planes to sell to Taiwan. Taiwan’s fleet of F-100s and F-
104s needed to be replaced. Defense wanted to sell Taiwan the F-4s, as they felt the planes 
would offer longer term protection. State was worried that selling the latest aircraft technologies 
to Taiwan would draw an adverse reaction from Beijing, and wanted to limit sales to the F-5E.69 
In the discussions and memorandums between Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance, the connection 
between arms sales and human rights was not mentioned. 
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After normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China, the dynamics of 
foreign policy between the United States and Taiwan were forever changed. The United States 
would need to distance itself from Taiwan, while also offering reassurances that it would protect 
democratic allies against communist threats. Hardliners in Congress were deeply upset by the 
reconciliation with Red China and, as far as they saw it, the abandonment of a democratic ally. 
The Carter administration would need to assure the Taiwanese, Congress, and the world, that the 
United States was serious about insuring Taiwan’s safety and de facto autonomy, and this would 
take the form of continuing arms shipments to Taiwan.  
Arms sales of lesser quality had to be continued in order to appease people like Senator 
Barry Goldwater and other conservatives who demanded America to continue to have a strong 
military relationship with Taiwan and ensure their autonomy. After normalizing America’s 
relationship with China, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which insured that the 
United States would continue to have a military relationship with Taiwan, and would require 
arms sales to continue.70 
 Congress was also interested in the human rights issue in Taiwan, and did include 
language in the Taiwan Relations Act that demanded the enhancement of human rights in 
Taiwan. Lester L. Wolff, one of the authors of the Taiwan Relations Act, had long been 
interested in human rights. His 1977 visit to Taiwan had also caused quite a commotion in the 
country, and drew some criticism from the Kuomintang. He allowed a member of his staff, John 
Salzberg, to speak with the families of arrested opposition figures.71 This was a powerful 
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statement to the Taiwanese about the interest the issue was drawing in the American Congress. 
Thanks to the efforts of Wolff, Edward Kennedy, and others, who had either visited Taiwan or 
highlighted the issue at home, language was included in the Taiwan Relations Act to demand that 
Taiwan adhered to democratic principles and defended human rights. However, this was 
consistent with the language used since the 1950s. 
 The original security treaty between the Republic of China and the United States had also 
included the requirement that both nations continue to improve their democratic institutions at 
home.72 The United States had never criticized the regime on these grounds before, despite some 
complaints from activists that the United States had a duty to do so. The inclusion of such vague 
language in the Taiwan relations acts was simply another symbolic move. Also, it was members 
of Congress that spearheaded the inclusion of this language, rather than the Carter 
administration.  
 The 1976 Arms Export Control Act was also a tool for Congress theoretically to hold up 
arms sales if the congress felt that the weapons were not being used for legitimate self-defense.73 
Along with the Mutual Defense Treaty’s language, there was already a legal framework to deny 
arms sales to Taiwan, but this was not used. The Taiwan Relation act only repeated what had 
already been in place. 
 Due to the ongoing necessity of proving America’s dedication to the defense of Taiwan, 
it was also difficult to stop the sales of more basic arms. Harvey Feldman pointed out that the 
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United States was ignoring the basic principle of the human rights policy. He said that “the ROC 
at this time was still an authoritarian dictatorship, with all of the attributes to such a regime – 
political prisoners, government controlled press, etc. That ran directly against the Carter 
administration’s human rights policy. So from that point of view, even rifles and hand grenades 
should not have been approved.”74 However, arms sales consistently continued, even in the 
aftermath of major crackdowns on the political opposition. 
Within days of the Kaohsiung Incident, Vance sent a memorandum to Carter outlining 
which weapons they should sell to Taiwan. The only limitation they had was what would offend 
China, and Vance mentioned that they must continue to sell some arms in order to prove their 
commitment to Taiwan.75 Not once is human rights mentioned in the memorandum, despite the 
fact that almost the entire leadership of the opposition was just thrown into jail. In April of 1980, 
a few months after the incident, Derian recommended limiting arms sales because of the 
crackdown on the dangwai in the Kaohsiung Incident, but her request was ignored.76  
In a congressional hearing on the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act in June of 
1980, Richard Holbrooke answered questions on the continuing relationship of the United States 
with Taiwan. He acknowledged that the Taiwan Relations Act demanded the United States to 
monitor the human rights situation in Taiwan, and that the American Institute in Taiwan and 
their Taiwanese counterparts had been in contact about the crackdown in the Kaohsiung 
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Incident.77 When discussing arms sales however, he never mentioned the possibility of using 
these sales as leverage in the aftermath of the Kaohsiung Incident. He also said that the United 
States had sold $800 million worth of arms to Taiwan in 1979, and that on January 5th 1980 they 
had already informed Congress of the plan to sell another $280 million worth of military 
equipment.78 
According to David Dean, during his tenure as Director of AIT, limiting arms sales was 
always off the table. He wrote in his memoir that “As for U.S. pressure on human rights, it is 
important to note that this pressure (as contrasted to the congressional hearings and resolutions 
noted above) was private. Instead we used private discussions to try to convince President 
Chiang and other top officials that attention to progress on human rights and democracy would 
benefit Taiwan’s image and relations both in the United States and, in the long term, 
internationally.”79 
 Another issue was that the United States was already threatening to cancel arms sales if 
Taiwan did not cancel its nuclear program, which made it more difficult to also use withholding 
arms sales as punitive measure for human rights abuses. The United States had consistently 
opposed nuclear proliferation, and the signs that Taiwan was moving to start their own nuclear 
weapons program was very worrying. If the PRC believed Taiwan was becoming a nuclear 
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power, it easily could have triggered a war. The United States had long acted to restrain Taiwan 
on its provocative actions towards China, and the nuclear issue demanded a quick response. 
 The United States secretly moved to discourage the Taiwanese from developing nuclear 
weapons. One of the methods they used was tying continuing arm sales to the nuclear issue. As 
long as they ceased to develop nuclear capabilities, the United States would continue the 
shipments. While the United States could not use the latest technology as leverage, as this could 
damage the normalization process with the PRC, they were still able to use older equipment as 
leverage. 
 Harvey Feldman, when discussing the issues of nuclear weapons on Taiwan, said that 
“We tightened the screws very hard on the ROC; we threatened all kinds of dire consequences if 
the program was not terminated. One of our threats fell in the area of arms sales, which we used 
as a club in the nuclear arms issue. I think that the promised squeeze in this area was one of the 
principal reasons for the dismantling of the project.”80 
 In Taiwan, it was not possible to use arms sales as leverage due to the normalization of 
relations with China, combined with the necessity to continue selling arms to Taiwan as a 
symbol of America’s commitment to the island. Other issues, such as nuclear non-proliferation, 
also took precedence over human rights, further reducing the possibility of refusing arms for the 
sake of human rights. Since the Human Rights Bureau was integrated directly into the arms sales 
process, their inability to influence the sales limited their ability to enforce the new human rights 
policy. 
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Chapter 3: Repercussions of Normalization on Human Rights in Taiwan 
 When the Carter administration implemented the human rights policy while also 
normalizing relations with China, the administration opened America’s foreign policy to a 
number of attacks on human rights grounds. People in both Taiwan and the United States were 
critical of America’s new close relationship with the People’s Republic of China. The United 
States generally never criticized the People’s Republic of China, but the United States was 
critical of states like Taiwan, where human rights abuses were never as serious as in China.  
The announcement of Carter’s new human rights policy was seen as an opportunity in 
Taiwan to isolate mainland China. The dominant view of the Kuomintang’s supporters was that 
since the Mainland was so much worse, it was hypocritical to criticize Taiwan for these issues. 
Chiang Ching-kuo himself did not see the new policy as a threat to him or his regime, and used it 
as an opportunity to discredit the mainland. He declared a new human rights day celebration on 
December 25, 1976, and claimed that Taiwan protected the liberties of its people, and that any 
trespasses were done solely for the sake of protecting the country from communism.81 He used 
the opportunity to stress Taiwan’s democratic constitution, economic freedom, and relative legal 
protection compared to the mainland.  
A 1977 memorandum from the American consulate in Hong Kong spelled out wide-
ranging issues that would stem from applying human rights standards to China. Roger Sullivan, 
Deputy Director for the North East Asia region, wrote that the issue was sensitive and had 
implications for the recognition of the People’s Republic of China.  
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According to the memorandum, a primary concern of the Chinese about the American 
human rights policy was that it would weaken the position of the United States in the third world, 
to the benefit of the Soviet Union.82 China’s primary interest in opening relations with the United 
States was to isolate the Soviet Union internationally, and the new human rights policy could 
limit the United States’ usefulness as an ally to that end. The Chinese were also very sensitive 
about being criticized about human rights themselves. Sullivan wrote that the Chinese had a very 
different definition of human rights, and were unwilling to change their perspective from their 
Marxist philosophical traditions. He also argued that due to China’s legalist culture there would 
be little support for human rights reforms, as the individual was fundamentally less important to 
society than the collective. 
When it came to Taiwan, Sullivan wrote that “Taiwan has seized upon the human rights 
issue as a weapon against US-PRC normalization” and that “the administration’s foreign policy 
goal of advancing human rights has been linked with security of the [Republic of China].”83 He 
describes how the Taiwanese government used a “dual strategy of execrating the PRC while 
embellishing their own record.”84 Taiwan engaged in the tactic of comparing their human rights 
record with mainland China to prevent normalization, arguing that the United States had a 
“moral duty” to refuse relations with the PRC.  
The memorandum gives two examples of how the Taiwanese government tried to take 
advantage of Carter’s human rights policy in promoting their own agenda. Sullivan believed that 
Taiwan was probably behind forging a letter addressed to Carter which was published in a Hong 
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Kong newspaper. The letter, supposedly written by a defector from Shanghai, called on Carter to 
not recognize the People’s Republic of China. There was a second open letter from a Hong Kong 
newspaper that asked Carter to denounce the People’s Republic of China, which Sullivan also 
believed was forged by Taiwanese agents.85 Sullivan’s memorandum also mentions that Taiwan 
is actively trying to improve their human rights image, but he did not say if they were actually 
trying to improve their human rights situation. 
 Pro-government Taiwanese groups also protested the American government’s apparently 
hypocritical relationship with the People’s Republic of China. In August of 1977, the American 
embassy received a petition addressed to Secretary Vance from 1,475 Taiwanese professors. 
Fearful of America’s growing relationship with the People’s Republic of China, their letter 
complained that Vance had been unduly supportive of mainland China while ignoring Taiwan. 
They wrote that “Vance placed more attention on the adversaries of the United States than on its 
allies” and that “if the United States betrays an old friend in order to embrace an old enemy, no 
one will believe there is an [sic] value in American commitments, nor will anyone take seriously 
the American call for freedom, democracy, and human rights.”86 
 Brzezinski also noted the impact that America’s human rights policy would have on the 
Taiwan lobby. He reported that the Taiwan lobby was making the argument that Taiwan was 
receptive to America’s human rights program while the People’s Republic were violating human 
rights. Brzezinski added “in my opinion, there is a great deal of truth in this claim.”87 
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 In 1977, Brzezinski asked the CIA to draft a report on the impact of the administration’s 
human rights policy. In the report, the analysts concluded that the new policy was met with 
disinterest in East Asia as a whole, and that the American backed dictators did not seem to 
believe it would affect them. In the case of Taiwan, the report mentions that the mainlanders 
having continued to oppress the Taiwanese, and that the regime will try to use the favorable 
contrast with the mainland’s human rights record as a way to support their own regime.88 
 At the 1977 Congressional hearing before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, the Kuomintang’s supporters made 
similar arguments. Wang Yu-yan, a Taiwanese member of the Kuomintang and the mayor of 
Kaohsiung, defended the government’s human rights policy. He argued that the government’s 
policy was only targeting communists, and that all of the human rights cases that had been 
brought up at the hearing were being misconstrued.89 He constantly drew parallels between the 
Republic of China and the mainland to defend the government, trying to argue that Taiwan was a 
true friend of the United States and the free world, and that America was hypocritically turning 
away from its old ally.  
 Richard H. Yang, a professor of political science, also testified at the hearing to defend 
the Republic of China’s human rights record. He argued that the threat of communism was real 
and apparent. He said that “the war threat is not a fiction. It is not an abstract threat. It is real.”90 
He argued that the student protestors were mostly communists, and that the foreign human rights 
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activists were overstating how many innocent people were being accused of being communists. 
He claimed that the actions of the Kuomintang were necessary because of the constant threat 
from the Mainland, who had a far worse record on human rights than the Republic of China.91  
 Yang presented a binary choice to the committee: the Nationalists or the Communists. He 
supported his argument with an anecdote about a student he met at Washington University, 
where he taught at in America. He talked about how he met a Taiwanese exchange student 
preaching Taiwanese independence. Yang confronted him, pressing him to describe which 
country he wants to model an independent Taiwan after. Apparently, the student broke down and 
admitted he wanted to model an independent Taiwan after Peking.92 This anecdote displays the 
strongly held belief amongst nationalist supporters that the independence activists were affiliated 
with communists, and that the dire situation called for the suspension of rights. 
 Senator Barry Goldwater also submitted a letter to the committee to defend the human 
rights record of the Republic of China, and the entire first section of the letter focused on 
drawing parallels between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China.93 
Goldwater claimed that “the true extent to which human rights are granted and safeguarded by 
the Republic of China can be more easily seen when contrasted with the denial of all recognized 
civil liberties by the People’s Republic of China.”94 He went on to laud the religious freedoms, 
economic freedoms, and legal protection that the Republic of China offered compared to the 
mainland. He also claimed that those being persecuted by the government on Taiwan were 
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generally communists who genuinely threatened the state. He argued that the current suspension 
of some legal protections were in line with other constitutional democracies, including the 
United States. He also wrote that the imminent communist threat justified the suspension of civil 
liberties, comparing it to Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the American 
civil war.  
 Goldwater made the argument that China had no free press while Taiwan had 31 daily 
newspapers and 1,400 magazines.95 One of the cases being discussed before the committee that 
day was actually the case of Huang Hua, the editor of a pro-independence magazine, who was 
convicted of sedition after his pro-independence paper was shut down. The Taiwanese media 
was strictly regulated by the Taiwanese government, and it only appeared better than the 
mainland’s media on a superficial level. 
 These arguments also implied that there was a binary choice, either to continue 
supporting the Kuomintang or to somehow allow communism to take hold in Taiwan. When the 
Kuomintang and their supporters were criticized, it was easy for them to deflect criticism by 
pointing to the significantly worse situation in mainland China. Along with their claim that they 
were protecting Taiwan from communist takeover, these sorts of arguments tried to present the 
idea that allowing the Taiwanese independence movement to operate freely would somehow 
open Taiwan to the possibility of a communist takeover, and then the human rights situation 
would become much worse. The Carter administration’s failure to criticize the PRC opened it to 
an easy attack. If the United States was being so friendly to the PRC while critical of a quasi-
democratic regime, it made the Carter administration seem weak on communism.  
                                                          
95 Ibid 75 
Grogan 43 
 
 Another repercussion of the ongoing process of normalization with China was that many 
Taiwanese issues were seen primarily through the lens of normalization, and human rights were 
rarely considered in meetings on foreign policy. The priorities of the administration on Taiwan 
were outlined in a memorandum drafted by David Brown and signed by Vance in 1977. The first 
on the list was normalization of the relationship with mainland China and to “prepare the ROC 
for the inevitable changes that will accompany normalization.” Second was maintain peace in the 
Taiwan area. Third was to promote economic ties, and fourth was to have “constructive nuclear 
cooperation” and to “prevent the ROC from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.” The fifth 
objective on the list was to promote human rights. While the previous objectives all had detailed 
information to clarify the goal, the only clarification for the fifth point was that the United States 
needed to “ensure that the ROC understands the importance of human rights issues, both to the 
administration and to the American people personally, and encourage the evolution of a more 
open society in Taiwan.”96 This document illustrates the priorities of American foreign policy at 
the time. Human rights was generally an afterthought when considering America’s actual major 
foreign policy decisions. The primary focuses of the administration naturally continued to be 
security related. 
 The administration saw the Taiwan Problem from the perspective of negotiations with the 
mainland. Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski understood that the actions of the United States on the 
mainland would have large repercussions on Taiwan, but they were only worried about its 
potential impact on stability, and rarely mentioned human rights in the region. By being too 
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focused on normalization, Carter and Vance also both seemed to fundamentally misunderstand 
the Taiwanese independence movement. They believed that independence might be a course of 
action that Kuomintang might use after America normalized its relations with China. Vance was 
worried that Chiang Ching-kuo might declare independence from China, and that an independent 
Taiwan might become a Soviet satellite.97 This would have been impossible however, as 
declaring independence, and therefore renouncing their claims to the mainland, would have been 
political suicide for the Kuomintang. They would have instantly lost their base of supporters, 
who were refugees from the mainland and still desired to see China reunified. 
 In a meeting with his staff, Carter also wondered if the recognition of China would cause 
Taiwan to move for independence. 98 While some of his staff assured him that it was unlikely, 
Vance does mention that Taiwan “cannot be taken for granted.” In the same conversation 
Michael Oksenberg, a member of the National Security Council, argued that Taiwan would not 
go independent unless they were placed in extreme circumstances.  
 Many of the Taiwanese human rights activists were also independence activists, and the 
administration was bound by agreements with mainland China to publicly oppose any 
independence movements. Oksenberg, believed that China would support America’s ongoing 
relationship with Taiwan, as the United States could help prevent Taiwan from achieving 
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independence, which he believed could have resulted in a pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese regime on 
the island.99  
 Brzezinski also supported using stronger language to emphasize that the United States 
would never support an independent Taiwan. He recommended that “in addition to stating that 
‘We should neither encourage nor stimulate the creation of an independent Taiwan,’ we should 
also say we would not recognize an independent Taiwan.”100 
 An interesting example of American priorities having a negative impact on the human 
rights movement was the choice in timing of the recognition of the People’s Republic of China. 
The announcement came shortly before the election of 1978 in Taiwan, and the shock of the 
announcement caused the Kuomintang to cancel the election. Brzezinski and Vance were 
actually worried about the American elections in 1978, and did not consider the impact the 
announcement could have on the Taiwanese election. In a discussion between Brzezinski, 
Brown, Vance, and Oksenberg, they debated what the timing should be. Brzezinski supported 
waiting until after the 1978 election. Vance not only did not mention any repercussions the 
normalization might have on politics in Taiwan, but stated that it would be worrying if too many 
of those “two China types, those who are concerned with the human rights of the Taiwanese” 
were elected to Congress.101 Defense Secretary Brown was worried that if they waited for the 
American congressional elections, they would have to press through recognition quickly in early 
1979, and if their plans were stalled the recognition might have to wait until after the 1980 
Presidential election. Brown was also worried that if they did not recognize China and sign the 
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Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty at around the same time, it would be difficult to convince the 
American public that they were hard on communism.102  
Another policy paper prepared for the National Security Council staff said that rapid 
normalization with China was a necessity, as the recent flare up in Soviet activity would make 
Americans more accepting of the new relationship with China. The paper argued that the United 
States should officially recognize the People’s Republic of China before the end of 1978.103 
Brzezinski did later inform the president that he would have to make a choice about recognizing 
the PRC either before or after the US November elections of 1978.104 
 From the discussion with Vance and Brzezinski, it appears that Taiwanese domestic 
politics were not being carefully considered when the administration decided to recognize China 
in December of 1978. While some human rights activists seemed to assume there was a 
conspiracy between the Kuomintang and the United States, the truth was closer to the United 
States being ignorant of affairs in Taiwan, and failing to consider the repercussions of their 
actions on the human rights situation in Taiwan. Seeing that one of the cornerstones of Carter’s 
human rights policy was to consider human rights in major policy decisions, this was a massive 
failure on the part of the Carter administration. 
 Mark Pratt from AIT reported that the normalization of relations with the PRC was, as 
predicted, not a catastrophe for the Taiwanese government. He noted that it gave Chiang a 
chance to delay the elections, stack the government with more technocrats, and avoided giving 
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the opposition a larger voice.105 Eventually, many of these moderate appointments made by 
Chiang were important in the democratic transition, but there is no doubt that the elections could 
have been a chance for the growing dangwai movement to gain seats throughout Taiwan and to 
start presenting a nascent multiparty system.  
 One Foreign Service officer, William Brown, was worried that the United States shared 
some responsibility for the jailing of opposition figures due to the timing of the announcement 
for normalizing relations with the PRC. When discussing the case of Annette Lu, whose arrest he 
linked to the cancellation of the 1978 election, he suggested that the United States had 
unintentionally caused the protests and crackdowns that led to her arrest. He said that “I think 
that few of us had ever realized the relative costs of going along with decisions like President 
Carter's announcement on the change in the pattern of our diplomatic representations in China. 
She had spent 12 years106 in prison as a result.”107 
 The politics of normalization had negative effects on promoting human rights in Taiwan. 
For one, it made the United States appear hypocritical. The Kuomintang and their supporters 
used human rights as a weapon against the United States’ normalization plans, and deflected 
attention from their own human rights abuses to the People’s Republic of China. One of the 
major goals of the human rights policy was to ensure that human rights was a fundamental part 
of policy discussion, but this was absent from discussions on the timing for the recognition of 
                                                          
105 “Telegram from the Taipei Office of the American Institute in Taiwan to the Washington Office of the American 
Institute in Taiwan.” September 29, 1979. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XIII, China, 
eds. David Nickles and Adam Howard. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013), Document 276. 
106 Lu was sentenced to twelve years but did not serve the full duration. 
107 William Andreas Brown, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, November 3, 1998. Foreign Affairs Oral History 
Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. www.adst.org. 187 
Grogan 48 
 
China in 1978. The failure to account for the Taiwanese election had serious ramifications and 
was a setback for the Taiwanese human rights movement. 
Chapter 4: Embassy Initiatives and Success in Promoting Human Rights 
 As the Human Rights Bureau had little leverage over arms sales, and because human 
rights was not a major part of policy discussions in the White House, it often fell to the American 
embassy in Taiwan and later the American Institute in Taiwan to promote human rights. There 
are a number of examples of their success, although they acted quietly and without taking credit 
for their achievements. Since their activities were primarily through backchannels, human rights 
activists generally did not know about their activities and were strongly critical of the United 
States. The strong rhetoric from the Carter administration made the United States seem 
hypocritical to the international human rights movement, despite the fact that there was real 
pressure coming from local initiatives. 
 There were a number of reasons for why the American embassy was active in human 
rights cases in Taiwan. For one, even before Carter’s election, it was part of its role to watch the 
human rights situation. Increasing congressional interest was also a factor. The Human Rights 
Bureau did at least have a small role however in promoting increased activity at the American 
embassy. David G. Brown, a Foreign Service officer in Taiwan, said that they wanted to “be 
active on this acting in a way that made sense and would yield results, rather than being driven 
by Patt Derian.”108 The cases of success in Taiwan were generally characterized by person to 
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person interactions, quiet diplomacy, and consistent communication with both activists and 
government officials. 
 At the Congressional Hearing on Taiwanese human rights in 1977, Burt Levin, Director 
of the Office of Republic of China Affairs, described the embassy’s approach to human rights at 
the beginning of the Carter presidency, and argued that it adhered to the human rights policy. He 
said that the department’s policy has been to quietly encourage human rights with people in the 
government. He added that they have maintained contacts with opposition figures and were 
particularly interested in political prisoners.109 There are numerous examples of where this quiet 
diplomacy had a beneficial influence on Taiwan. 
 One example was the incident in which the American office in Tainan was bombed in 
1971. American officials suspected the attack was carried out by radical supporters of the 
Kuomintang, but the Taiwanese arrested a local Taiwanese for the crime instead.110 Hiseh 
Tsung-min was accused of bombing the offices in Tainan and also for bombing a Bank of 
America in Taipei. The Americans were also convinced from the beginning he was not guilty. 
 At first, the United States was wary to become too involved. While there were requests 
from Congress to look into the case, the United States did not want to directly ask the Taiwan 
Garrison Command about his status in prison. In 1977, while the embassy did not keep contact 
with him directly, they were able to learn information about him due to Representative Wolff’s 
visit to Taiwan. John Salzberg, a member of Wolff’s staff, met with the families of a number of 
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arrested opposition figures, including Hsieh’s family, and his reports gave the State Department 
and congress information on his wellbeing in prison. 111  In Fraser’s hearing on human rights in 
1977, the Hsieh case was one of the key cases discussed at the hearing.112 Afterwards, the State 
Department became interested in the case, and the United States started to monitor his situation 
and health in prison. After the government announced the schedule for Hsieh’s release, Warren 
Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, asked to be kept up to date on Hsieh’s situation. The 
embassy was also instructed to contact Christopher if there were any complications with Hsieh’s 
release.113 
 Months after his release, the American embassy received a report from an American 
professor who met with Hsieh and made sure he was well. The professor reported that it 
appeared that Hsieh had been tortured in prison. While Hsieh was free from prison, he and his 
family continued to be followed by the police, and were afraid of being seen in public with 
foreigners.114 Eventually, Hsieh was even able to come to America, even though he had been 
convicted of a terrorist attack on an American government building.115 Hsieh also became a 
successful politician for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after democratization. 
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 This case was particularly interesting since the United States was also a victim. In this 
case, the Kuomintang appeared to have purposefully destroyed evidence and framed an 
opposition member for an attack on the United States.116 However, the Americans were able to 
see the situation clearly and not make any harsh judgements against Hsieh. While the embassy 
was not directly responsible for Hsieh’s release, their ability to support the congressional hearing 
on human rights in Taiwan was crucial for gaining international attention of the case. American 
officials continued to monitor his wellbeing and embassy staff were eventually able to meet with 
him after his release. 
 The Ch’en Chu case is a good example of how the American embassy intervened on the 
behalf of an opposition figure. Ch’en Chu was an opposition figure with close ties to Shih Ming-
teh and Linda Gail Arrigo, two prominent opposition figures, and was active in recruiting 
supporters for the dangwai movement. On June 23, 1978, she was detained by the Taiwan 
Garrison Command, although the reasons for doing so were unclear. While being held by the 
Taiwan Garrison Command, she was subjected to four days and nights of interrogation without 
rest, where she was tricked into signing a confession, and she was forced to attend a press 
conference where she denounced the opposition movement. On July 6th she was finally released 
on bail, but was not able to return home until July 24th.117  
 On June 23rd, soon after she disappeared, Lin Yi-hsiung and Chang Chun-hang, both 
assemblymen and part of the dangwai, went to the American embassy for help. They met with an 
American embassy official and asked him to ensure Ch’en would not be arrested by the 
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Taiwanese government. Lin and Chang believed that if she was arrested and tried it could 
possibly be the beginning of a crackdown on the whole opposition movement.118  
 The Taiwanese government was also worried that the United States might become 
involved, and they quickly contacted the embassy to request that they deny Ch’en Chu asylum if 
she were to ask for it. Ambassador Unger was also worried that if Ch’en did apply for asylum 
that the Ch’en Case could become a cause celebre for the Taiwanese opposition, and the United 
States would be put into a very difficult situation.119 
 A telegram, drafted by Feldman and signed by Vance, instructed the embassy to request 
information on the case, while claiming that this was a necessary due to a congressional 
investigation. They also requested that the embassy tell the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign 
affairs that holding a prisoner incommunicado was itself a violation of human rights. They also 
instructed them to continue requesting permission for embassy officials to attend her trial if it 
was held.120 
 Harvey Feldman, on his own initiative, found a way to secure her release, and while there 
were rumors that the Americans were involved, he did not confirm his involvement to the 
opposition until the 1990s.121 Feldman’s method, which he claimed to have used multiple times 
successfully, was to call his contact, General Wen Hai-hsiung. Wen had been an assistant to 
Chiang Ching-kuo, who had recently succeeded his father as president. Feldman would tell Wen 
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that a recent human rights case was preventing him from submitting a memorandum requesting 
approval for arms sales, and Wen would pass this on either directly to Chiang or to other officials 
in Taipei.122 In the case of Chen Chu, Feldman bargained with fighter jets.123 As mentioned 
earlier, the F-4s were already off the table, and were never going to be approved, and due to 
support from congress, the other jets had to be sold to Taiwan and could not have been held up 
on human rights grounds. The ploy worked, however, and Ch’en Chu was released from prison. 
After her release, Feldman was able to meet with her, and another opposition activist Annette Lu, 
and hear Ch’en’s side of the events.124  
 The consistent communication with opposition figures, such as Hsieh, Ch’en, Lu, and 
Lin, affected the embassy’s relationship with the Taiwanese authorities. With the planned 
election of 1978 coming soon, the Taiwanese were worried that the United States was aiding the 
opposition. General Wang Ching-hsu invited embassy officials to a luncheon shortly before the 
scheduled elections of 1978. Wang warned the officials that the close contact between the 
opposition and embassy officials could be misconstrued by voters as suggesting that the United 
States was supporting the opposition.125 
 At the luncheon the general made it clear that the presence of Americans in Taiwan’s 
opposition was worrying to the Kuomintang. Although General Wang was careful to not state it 
bluntly, he implied that the presence of Americans in the opposition movement would make the 
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situation more complicated if there was a crackdown. He also seemed particularly annoyed by 
the American Linda Gail Arrigo, whose marriage to Shih Ming-teh made the situation more 
difficult for them.126 However, while Arrigo’s presence did force the Kuomintang to consider the 
possibility of American intervention, after the Kaohsiung Incident they were still able to 
successfully arrest Shih Ming-teh and deport Arrigo.  
 The Kaohsiung Incident was a critical point in the history of Taiwan’s democratization. 
Since forming a new political party was illegal, the dangwai were forced to organize around non-
party organizations, and they used Formosa Magazine (Meili Dao) as one method for 
organization. Formosa Magazine had been promoting dangwai candidates, and was organizing 
rallies for them. The Kuomintang ignored the loopholes, and in the Kaohsiung Incident, they 
cracked down on the magazines and its leaders as if they were an illegal political party. 
 On December 10th, 1979, a dangwai led protest ended in violence, with many security 
officials and protestors injured. No one was killed in the incident.127 The incident was used as an 
excuse to arrest opposition leaders in mass. Ch’en Chu was arrested again. Linda Gail Arrigo’s 
husband, Shih Ming-teh, was arrested, and Arrigo was deported. Other opposition leaders such 
as Yao Chia-wen, Chang Chun-hun, Lin Yi-hsiung, Lin Hung-hsuan, and Lu Hsiu-lien were 
arrested.128 Shih Ming-teh evaded arrest for a short time under the protection of Reverend Kao of 
the Presbyterian Church. After he was discovered, Kao was also arrested for harboring him.  
 The situation was very difficult for the Americans. The Taiwan Relations Act had just 
recently been passed, and it held the United States to promote human rights in Taiwan. However, 
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arms sales continued to be both a political necessity in the United States, and it was also 
necessary to protect Taiwan from potential aggression. Patricia Derian took notice of the 
Kaohsiung incident, and recommended ending the sales of tear gas to Taiwan and halting 
weapons supplies.129 However, the Carter administration continued to approve arms sales. 
 The American embassy and later the American Institute in Taiwan did move to protect 
the prisoners, although they were not open about their efforts. Arrigo, for instance, was very 
disappointed in the embassy’s response to her husband’s arrest and her deportation. She went to 
the press in the United States to try to pressure the Taiwanese government on her own. However, 
the United States did keep in close contact with the Taiwanese government, and made it clear 
that the United States opposed the arrests and convictions of the opposition leaders. The 
Americans were also particularly concerned about Reverend Kao.130 The United States pressed 
for the release of those arrested in the Kaohsiung incident, but it still took years for them to be 
released. 
 In January of 1980 AIT official David Dean, who was also a friend of the opposition 
politician Kang Ning-hsiang, went to speak with representatives from the government to discuss 
the Kaohsiung incident. He expressed his concern that if any of the leaders of Formosa Magazine 
were executed, that it could cause violence throughout the country. He spoke with Premier Y.S. 
Sun, General Wang, and other high ranking officials to express the United States’ concerns about 
the incident. Dean wrote that “AIT concentrated its efforts in seeking freedom for the Kaohsiung 
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Eight and the Reverend Kao. Gradually, over the next several years, our persistent efforts were 
successful.”131 After his meetings with government officials, Dean was contacted by Chiang 
Ching-kuo, who promised that none of the arrested opposition leaders would executed. 
 In the aftermath of the Kaohsiung Incident, Taiwan would shock the world after the 
murder of Lin Yi-hsiung’s family. Lin, who had been in contact with the Americans on issues 
such as Ch’en Chu’s 1978 arrest, was being held in prison for his part at Formosa Magazine. 
After his arrest, his home was under constant police surveillance. While his wife visited him in 
prison, someone entered his family home and murdered his mother and two of his children, while 
his third child was severely injured in the attack. 
 Initially, opposition figures and other human rights activists refused to believe that the 
Kuomintang could be responsible for the murder of the elderly and children, although Bruce 
Jacobs changed his opinion after it was confirmed that the Taiwanese government was behind 
the murder of Henry Liu in the mid-1980s.132 The case has never been solved, but the 
circumstances show that the surveilling police must have known who entered the home, and 
modern investigations suggest that some evidence was possibly destroyed by the authorities.133  
 The government wasted no time in finding a scapegoat. They chose the American Bruce 
Jacobs, a professor doing research in Taiwan who was friends with Lin Yi-hsiung, as the likely 
suspect. The evidence used against him was the claim that he had visited the house that day, 
although this was not true. He had called earlier that day and spoke with Lin’s mother. After he 
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heard about the murder, he contacted the police and told them about his phone call, and he 
initially had no suspicions that the murders could have been instigated by the government. 
 Jacobs’ arrest spurred AIT into action. Mark Pratt, an embassy official, said that his 
interpretation of the case was that “The authorities apparently selected him and inferred he might 
have been the one who went there and killed the mother and the two daughters” and that, while 
no one believed he was the real murderer, “it was their only way of trying at least to get plenty of 
newspaper coverage to distract attention to Jacobs and all the rest of it.” Pratt also said that “it 
was at the beginning a pretty shoddy thing, but it made us realize that this event closely 
implicated the security services.”134 After Jacobs disappeared, embassy officials stayed up all 
night searching for him, and when Jacobs was released they were waiting for him. Afterwards, 
while Jacobs was virtually placed under house arrest in a hotel, AIT kept close contact with him, 
requiring him to call the embassy everyday so that they would know if he went missing again.135 
Eventually, after the government press had run stories for weeks on how he was the likely killer, 
the government dropped the charges and Jacobs was able to leave the country safely. By this 
time they had deflected suspicion from themselves long enough to let him go. 
 Mark Pratt, who helped handle Jacob’s case, believed that a senior member of the 
Kuomintang was responsible for the murders. He said that the suspicion in the American 
embassy was that Alex Chiang, the son of Chiang Ching-kuo, was responsible. Pratt said that “in 
the end I finally came to the conclusion that this was probably something which had been 
encouraged by Chiang Ching-kuo's second son, Alex, who had always been a bit of an unguided 
missile. In any case, he had many friends within the security services, and he thought of this as a 
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glamorous type of life. The story was that he was drunk at a bar and said, you know, ‘Really, 
somebody ought to take care Lin Yi-hsiung's mother and family to teach them a lesson,’ because 
the mother was even on the telephone to Taiwanese elements in Japan telling them how her son 
was being mistreated.”136 
 While the United States was unable to always secure quick releases of Taiwanese 
opposition figures, the American embassy did work remarkably fast to protect their own citizens 
in Taiwan. The case also demonstrates how American officials still had a deep mistrust of the 
regime on Taiwan. Just as in the case of the Tainan office bombing, American officials remained 
suspicious of the Taiwan’s official stories. In this case, Jacobs was an American citizen, and it is 
not surprising they were more direct in securing his release than in the case of Hsieh, but they 
had always been sympathetic to the opponents of the Kuomintang. 
 While numerous American embassy officials were involved in monitoring human rights 
cases, keeping contacts with opposition figures, and taking initiative to secure the release of 
dissidents, human rights would become a primary objective for the American Institute in Taiwan. 
When Charles Cross became the first director of AIT in 1979, he set out to make promoting 
human rights a fundamental part of AIT’s mission. He wrote in his memoir that efforts in 
promoting human rights took more time and effort than any other activity of AIT in its first few 
years, and that “The entire staff was involved in the tasks of comprehensive reporting on the 
arrests and trials of dissident Taiwanese, assisting American citizens who were in serious trouble 
with the Kuomintang authorities for relationships with oppositionists, flagging false statements 
by the security service to the American press, meeting publicly with non-Kuomintang politicians, 
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and journalists to display our interest in their futures.”137 He adds that “all this pressure on the 
Kuomintang was conducted by the original AIT officers and our successors steadily, quietly, and 
without threats”138 
 One example of how Cross delivered criticism quietly was through his relationship with 
Admiral Ma Chi-chuang, who also had the ear of President Chiang Ching-kuo. Since he could 
not have an official relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo due to AIT’s status, he used the 
relationship with Ma to discuss human rights issues and have the American perspective on the 
issue passed on to the highest levels.139 
 Despite the activities of the American embassy and AIT, international human rights 
activists working in Taiwan did not trust that Carter was a genuine friend of the human rights 
movement. They believed that he was being opportunistic and was merely reacting to an ongoing 
international movement. Linda Gail Arrigo is a good example of a human rights activist who was 
deeply critical of the United States while she worked in Taiwan. 
 Arrigo was at first a PhD student studying factory work cultures in Taiwan before she 
became involved with the Independence Movement. She was sympathetic to their cause, and 
eventually married Shih Ming-teh, a famous opposition figure who would later become a 
prominent politician after democratization. In her memoirs she displayed an immense distrust of 
the United States. Arrigo went as far as to say she had believed that the United States was, 
echoing the language of Iran, the “Great Satan” of our time.140 She believed that the American 
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embassy in Taiwan was collaborating with the Taiwanese authorities. While her husband was in 
jail, she kept close contact with the American embassy, but was convinced that the Foreign 
Service officers were actively supporting the regime. 
Arrigo claimed that when she went to the American Institute in Taiwan to discuss a 
human rights case, Mark Pratt, the American Foreign Service officer who helped handle Jacob’s 
case, “laughed in my face” and “recited a remarkable piece of double talk that ‘enhance [human 
rights]’ meant to do the same as before, business as usual.” She said that after she heard about 
the arrest of the Formosa Magazine leaders, she wondered “had he given prior or post facto or 
tacit approval?”141 
 Another human rights activist, Nicki Croghan, wrote that after being expelled from 
Taiwan for engaging in protests, she was told at the American Institute in Taiwan that “I had got 
what I deserved.” She added “I was angry that the American government’s representative not 
only would not help me, but was also helping to maintain a dictatorship in Taiwan.”142  
 International human rights activists also supported conspiracy theories suggesting that the 
American CIA was actively cooperating with the Garrison Command and the police to persecute 
human rights activists. Arrigo writes in her memoir that “in April or May of 1978 I knew for sure 
that the American embassy was cooperating with the security agencies for my persecution.”143 
Her evidence was that when she was contacted by an American student, this student was later 
called by the embassy and warned not to contact Arrigo again. Arrigo also claims that she heard 
“vaguer” reports about American collaboration.   
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 Annette Lu, a Taiwanese opposition figure who would later become Chen Shui-bian’s 
vice-president in 2000, also reported that there were conspiracy theories circulating amongst 
Taiwanese activists that the United States conspired with the Kuomintang to cancel the 1978 
elections. Some of these activists believed that the United States purposefully timed the 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China right before the election to give an excuse to the 
Kuomintang to cancel the election.144 This claim is demonstrably false, but the presence of these 
conspiracy theories shows that the Carter administration was struggling to gain people’s trust. 
 Many of the complaints, conspiracy theories, and accusations about American support for 
the Kuomintang are groundless. The United States had never been a close ally of the 
Kuomintang. From the beginning, America was hesitant to support Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. 
Even before Carter was elected America had been weary of the Taiwanese government and was 
active in watching the independence and democratic movements, and while the United States 
took no direct action to help them, American personnel had always been sympathetic. There are 
numerous cases of American officials who worked on the behalf of dissidents throughout the 
history of American presence on Taiwan, although this had always been done quietly. 
It is unfortunate that despite the actions of embassy officials in Taiwan, many in the 
human rights movement still distrusted the United States. Arrigo thought of the United States as 
the “Great Satan” and claimed that Mark Pratt had laughed in her face when she argued that the 
United States had a duty to enhance human rights, and she even speculated that Pratt had given 
consent to the Taiwanese in arresting opposition figures in the Kaohsiung incident.145 In truth, 
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Pratt and others were active in promoting human rights in the small ways that they could, and 
Cross even made human rights an important part of AIT’s official policy. The American 
embassy and AIT did not have very much leverage to that end since their hands were constantly 
tied by issues such as nuclear proliferation and normalization with China, so they were forced to 
use quiet diplomacy that would not be recognized by the international human rights movement. 
Carter’s grand claims about human rights raised people’s expectations about what the United 
States should be doing to promote democracy, and silently working through backchannels did 
not gain the confidence of the international human rights movement. 
Conclusion 
 The Carter administration’s human rights policy had a number of problems in its 
application to Taiwan. The central goal of his policy was that the United States would make 
human rights considerations an integral part of foreign policy decision making. This did not 
happen for a variety of reasons. 
 For one, Patricia Derian and the Human Rights Bureau had little leverage in Taiwan. Due 
to the surrounding circumstance of normalization, it was impossible for the Bureau to tie arms 
sales to improvements in human rights, a tactic they used in many other countries. Derian would 
recommend cutting arms sales, as had been done in many other countries, but this was never 
implemented in Taiwan due to surrounding circumstances.146 In general it was embassy officials 
like Feldman and later Director Cross who took initiative and were able to get results. While it 
can be argued that the human rights policy encouraged this sort of local initiative, quiet criticism 
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of the Kuomintang had already been ongoing under earlier administrations, and the increased 
congressional interest in Taiwan was another factor for the increased embassy activity in human 
rights.  
 Human rights was also hardly mentioned in major policy discussions, despite this being 
one of the pillars of the human rights policy. In general, decisions that impacted Taiwan were 
focused almost solely on the issue of normalization, nuclear proliferation, and security, with 
human rights rarely ever being mentioned. 
 While embassy officials, and later AIT officials, were engaged in meaningful, quiet 
diplomacy, they were unable to prove their interest in human rights to international organization. 
Human rights activists were sometimes antagonistic to the United States in Taiwan since the 
Americans could not be transparent about what they knew or what they were doing in human 
rights cases. The American officials appeared uncaring and were harshly criticized despite the 
fact that they were directly involved in protecting opposition figures. Also, embassy officials had 
long been engaged in quiet criticism of the regime on Taiwan and had followed human rights 
abuses closely even before Carter’s election. 
 In respect to the major pillars of their policy, it is clear that their human rights policy 
made the United States seem hypocritical. The sort of quiet diplomacy that gained real results 
was already being done before Carter took office, and without the grand statements on human 
rights coming out of the State department. 
 When considering the American influence on Taiwanese democratization, it appears that 
the Carter administration’s policy had a limited but notable effect. The United States 
undoubtedly had some influence, especially when considering the impact of Congressional 
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investigations, which have been described by scholars like Bush and Jacobs. The Carter 
administration’s policies however were often contradictory, and did not seem to take into 
account the repercussions of American foreign policy on politics in Taiwan. While it is 
impossible to quantify the effectiveness of the human rights policy, it did have some impact on 
pushing American embassy officials, and later AIT officials, to take the initiative in human rights 
cases, which did have a notable impact. They were able to monitor the wellbeing of political 
prisoners, fought to secure the release of opposition figures, and continually informed Chiang 
and other prominent politicians of America’s stance on human rights issues. At the very least, 
through the American embassy and AIT, the United States did what it could to protect the 
opposition in Taiwan, and played a role in encouraging the Kuomintang to democratize Taiwan.  
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